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The Intelligent Design community1 that sprang to life in the last decade of
the twentieth century in the United States proposed, at least initially, to be
a purely scientific, and not a religious, enterprise. For instance, William A.
Dembski notes that “Proponents of intelligent design regard it as a scientific
research program that investigates the effects of intelligent causes” and
that this search for the “effects of intelligent causes” becomes controversial
only when it is applied to “the natural sciences where no embodied, reified,
or evolved intelligence could have been present,” as in, for example, the
biological sciences.2 Finally, and significantly, he contends that his concept of
intelligent design does not “invoke a supernatural cause where an ordinary
natural cause will do.”3
This proposal, while appearing vague on the surface of things, actually
has a historical trajectory that connects it with other, older approaches to
the theology-and-science dialogue. Although Dembski and his colleagues
change the terminology and attempt to argue from a scientific perspective,
the underlying meaning behind their concept of intelligent design falls within
a debate that G. C. Berkouwer divides neatly into two theological categories:
creationism and traducianism. The problem that Berkouwer speaks of relates
to the question of the “mysterious nature of man.”4 He proposes that the core
of the problem is “the immortality of the soul” and “the general questions
relating to its origin.”5 Thus, while Dembski’s position is that Intelligent
Design is a scientific rather than a religious concept, in actuality his proposal
falls within Berkouwer’s problem of the immortal soul. While he would prefer
to keep such religious and metaphysical perspectives in the background, a
careful reading of the Intelligent Design movement’s writings show that at

1
Where Intelligent Design is capitalized throughout this article, I am referring
specifically to the Intelligent Design movement spearheaded by Dembski et al.
2
William A. Dembski, “What Intelligent Design Is Not,” in Signs of Intelligence:
Understanding Intelligent Design, ed. William A. Dembski and James M. Kushiner (Grand
Rapids: Brazos, 2001), 17.
3
Dembski, 17.
4
G. C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1962), 279.
5
Ibid., 279.
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its foundation it is at least partly religiously motivated.6 The reason for this
religious motivation lies in the Intelligent Design movement’s differentitation
between intelligent design and nonintelligent design, or as Dembski refers to
them, “undirected natural causes.” “Intelligent causes,” he proposes,
can do things that undirected natural causes cannot. Undirected natural
causes can explain how ink gets applied to paper to form a random inkblot
but cannot explain an arrangement of ink on paper that spells out a
meaningful message. To obtain such a meaningful arrangement requires an
intelligent cause. Whether an intelligent cause is located within or outside
nature (i.e., is respectively natural or supernatural) is a separate question
from whether an intelligent cause has acted within nature. Design has no
prior commitment to supernaturalism. Consequently science can offer no
principled grounds for excluding design or relegating it to religion.7

Dembski’s Intelligent Design proposal placec a greater emphasis on the
creation, or intelligent design, of the “mysterious nature of man,” which,
in distinction to other evangelical views, they believe may be documented
empirically in nature.
However, if one has no definition of the supernatural or natural
designer, then how does one differentiate between apparent and intelligent
design? Dembski also seems here to give equal weight to the creation and
design of natural artifacts, whether human or nonhuman, i.e., animal.
Nor does he here differentiate between types of intelligences, whether
supernatural, human, or animal. Finally, he contends that because intelligent
design “does not require miracles” that it is not religious in nature.8 These
6
Dembski, 17. Some Intelligent Designers, such as Michael Denton do not
accept any form of biblical creationism, believing instead in a purely evolutionary
development of the human being. Denton, who is a former member of the Discovery
Institute, is now, however, more closely associated with the “directed evolution”
perspective, in which the origin of life was laid down in the initial conditions of a
fine-tuned universe (cf. Nature’s Destiny: How the Laws of Biology Reveal Purpose [New
York: Free Press, 1998]). Other proponents of this perspective include Alister E.
McGrath, A Fine-Tuned Universe: The Quest for God in Science and Theology, The 2009
Gifford Lectures (Nashville: Westminster John Knox, 2009); and Simon Conway
Morris, Life’s Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
7
William A. Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge between Science and Theology,
foreword Michael Behe (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1999), 259.
8
Ibid. Such a proposal implies that Dembski believes that God, as a supernatural
agent, works outside of time and history. Fernando L. Canale proposes contrastively
that God works within human history, even though he is not limited to these
parameters. This view of God’s reality is compatible with the incarnation of God in
the New Testament (see, e.g., “Doctrine of God,” in Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist
Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen [Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000], 105-159;
and idem, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presupposition,
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questions, although important to a definition of Intelligent Design, are
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we will focus only on the question
of the immortal soul, the traditional seat of intelligence in human beings.
As we will demonstrate in this article, Dembski and his colleagues in the
Intelligent Design movement actually do have a definition for their primary
designer. In as far as this designer is the Christian God, I am comfortable
with affirming that there is an intelligent designer, although I may disagree
with some adherents’ definitions of God. The source of my discomfort
with the Intelligent Design movement lies in their mixed message: on one
hand, they invoke a fully scientific program without ties to the supernatural,
while, on the other, they imagine, as we will see, a national system of laws
that intentionally invokes a classical Christian view of God as designer.
Understanding the history and ramifications of this view of a designer God
is important for understanding the Intelligent Design movement’s place in
not only the theology-and-science dialogue, but for its teaching in the public
school systems of the United States.
In the light of Dembski’s position, the purpose of this paper is to examine
the terminology of dualistic conceptions of body and soul (i.e., monogenesist,
traducianist, and polygenesist perspectives) within the older orthodox
traditions of the theology-and-science dialogue that arose in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries in response to Darwinian proposals and against
Berkouwer’s theological backdrop. We will begin by examining theological
categories cited by Berkouwer on the origin of the immortal soul.
The Origin of the Immortal Soul in Humanity:
Traducianism versus Creationism
Berkouwer begins his discussion of the problem by noting that “It is indeed
true that both the Church and theology have been interested in the origin
of man, in a sense; but this interest was always directed to the origin of the
human race.”9 However, he clarifies, the ancestry of humanity is not directly
the problem at hand. The crux of the problem lies in the question of dual
origins, i.e., the origin of the material universe and the origin of the immortal
soul. Are there two separate creations of human body and of the human
soul (creationism), or does the immortal soul, following the first direct divine
impartation, come into existence with the body, i.e., the body and soul are
inherited from the parents (traducianism)? While the debate over these issues
can become very complex, this paper will focus primarily on the question of
one versus two origins.
Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series [Berrien Springs: Andrews
University Press, 1987]).
9
Ibid.
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Berkouwer notes that by separating the origin of the material universe
from that of the origin of the immortal soul, science and theology have
managed to find room for simultaneous, but discipline-oriented, discussion
about the origins of humanity. Thus, whereas the origin of the material
universe is spoken of from within the Darwinian scientific realm, the origin
of the immortal soul falls within the purview of theology.10 However, he
questions the legitimacy of such a dualistic approach, stating: “It can hardly be
denied that the formulation of the two ‘questions of origin’ is quite different,
and that this very fact suggests the question as to how justified the usual
treatment in dogmatics is; in how far the dogmatician may legitimately speak
of a duality of origin.”11
Historically, questions regarding the creation and unity of the human
race and the fall of humanity have been closely related. Berkouwer notes that
“This is apparent already from the fact that traducianism has always appealed,
in its fight against creationism, to the unity of the human race. . . . Both
[traditionally] held to the unity of the human race in Adam (in which not
only the story of creation but especially Paul’s statement in Rom. 5, and the
text of Acts 17:26, played a role); and this was true in Catholicism (e.g., at
Trent) as well as in Protestantism.”12 Therefore, except for rare denials, the
problems surrounding the question of the unity of the human race were of
an “incidental and peripheral nature until recently.”13
The Problem of Science and Theology in Relation
to the Immortal Soul: Monogenism
versus Polygenism
The change in the biological sciences that came as a result of the Darwinian and
Neo-Darwinian scientific proposals gave meaning to the related problem of
monogenesis, or the origin of humanity from a single pair, versus polygenesis,
the origin of humanity from multiple pairs.14 The terms may be applied to two
separate, but related, issues: the issue of human ancestry and the issue of a
dual origin of material and immaterial elements of creation.
Creationism versus Traducianism
Before turning to these two approaches to the origin of the immortal soul, it
is first necessary to briefly clarify the relationship between traducianism and
creationism, on one hand, and polygenism and monogenism, on the other.
Ibid.
Ibid.
12
Ibid., 279-280.
13
Ibid., 280.
14
Ibid.
10
11
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As noted briefly above, creationism refers to the idea of separate origins of
the material and immaterial, or spiritual, aspects of the human being, while
traducianism contends that the soul comes into existence with the body. The
Catholic Encyclopedia helpfully notes that traducianism is
the doctrine that, in the process of generation, the human spiritual soul
is transmitted to the offspring by the parents. When a distinction is made
between the terms Traducianism and Generationism, the former denotes
the materialistic doctrine of the transmission of the soul by the organic
process of generation, while the latter applies to the doctrine according to
which the soul of the offspring originates from the parental soul in some
mysterious way analogous to that in which the organism originates from the
parent’s organism.15

Whereas creationism posits the special impartation of the immortal
soul in human beings, “Traducianism is opposed to Creationism or the
doctrine that every soul is created by God.”16 Thus Berkouwer posits that,
due to their respective orientations toward the interpretation of Scripture,
“we note in Lutheran theology a fairly general sympathy for traducianism,
while in Catholic and Calvinist theology preference is given to creationism.”17
Berkouwer clarifies how these two orientations differ:
Lutherans saw the image of God primarily in the spiritual attributes of man
(justitia originalis) and thus had little interest in what distinguishes man from
animal after the fall, since the (lost) justitia originalis was for them the one
thing that matters. Calvinists and Catholics wished to concern themselves
with ‘the wholly unique essence of man,’ and thus with what remained
human also after the Fall.18

The relationship between creationism and traducianism and monogenism
and polygenism is complex. However, as noted, both creationism and
traducianism are grounded upon the unity of humanity. In other words, there is
a unity in the coming together of bodily matter and immortal soul that creates
a whole human being. The connection, then, to monogenism and polygenism,
which will be discussed more extensively below, is that monogenism refers to
this “mysterious way” in which the soul and body come together, either by
being passed on from the parents (as in traducianism) or via a special and
individual creative act by divine fiat (as in creationism). As we will see, these
ideas are not separate from ideas concerning the ancestral origin of humans.
In the following discussion of polygenesis and monogenesis we will focus only
on the Roman Catholic orientation and responses to these issues. However,
The Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v., “Traducianism” (http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/15014a.htm).
16
Ibid.
17
Berkouwer, 286.
18
Ibid., 287.
15
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as noted, the Calvinist tradition shares a similar view, although it differs in its
position from Roman Catholicism due to its orientation toward Scripture and
tradition.19 Traditional Lutheranism tends more toward a position supporting
traducianism.
Polygenesis As It Relates to Human Ancestry
The term “polygenesis” typically refers to the “origination of a race or species
from a number of independent stocks.”20 During the Renaissance, many
traditional and orthodox ideas were openly questioned. Among these was
the idea of the unity of the human race, which resulted in speculations that
“only civilized men were descendents [sic] of Adam and that ‘savage’ people
had been separately created,” ideas that were “closely associated with efforts
to find a niche for the savage below civilized human beings on the elaborately
graded hierarchy known as the ‘great chain of being,’ a traditional device for
ranking all forms of life inherited from the Middle Ages.”21
However, the attempt to fix a distinct and inferior species of humans
was not made until the Englishman William Petty, F.R.S., tried to do so in
an unpublished paper of 1676-1677, but his “religious heterodoxy would
preclude the widespread acceptance of such a mode of thinking about the
‘types of mankind’ until,” G. M. Fredrickson proposes, “the nineteenth
century.”22 Indeed Petty’s ideas about race did not begin to fully engage until
some fifty years later when, in Sweden, Carl Linnaeus laid out the different
races of humans in The System of Nature (1735). Homo Sapiens, he proposed,
include a number of races, or human subspecies: Ferus, Americanus, Europaeus,
Asiaticus, Afer, and Monstrosus.23
For a more complete discussion of the Reformed understanding of creationism,
see ibid., 287 ff. Here Berkouwer discusses at length the positions of Bavinck and
Kuyper.
20
Oxford Dictionaries, s.v., “polygenesis.”
21
George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and
South African History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 10.
22
Ibid., 11.
23
Caroli Linnaei, Systema Naturae per Regna Tria Naturae, Secundum Classes,
Ordines,Genera, Species, cum Characteribus, Differentiis, Synonymis, Locis. Tomus I., edition
Decima, Reformata (Holmiae, Impensis Direct. Laurentii Salvii, 1758), 20-23.
19

1. “Four-footed, mute, hairy. Wildman (i.e., Ferus).
2. Copper-coloured, choleric, erect. American (i.e., Americanus).
Hair black, straight, thick; nostrils wide; face harsh; beard scanty; obstinate, content,
free. Paints himself with fine red lines. Regulated by customs.
3. Fair, sanguine, brawny. European (i.e., Europaeus).
Hair yellow, brown, flowing; eyes blue; gently [sic], acute, inventive. Covered with
close vestments. Governed by laws.
4. Sooty, melancholy, rigid (i.e., Asiaticus).
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In Germany, Johann Gottfried Herder24 followed in the steps of Petty
and Linnaeus. Rudolf Bultmann points to Herder as the beginning of sorrows
for the German nation in Herder’s affirmation of the Völkische (or populist,
ethnic) Movement in Germany, noting that
It was Herder who broke away from the concept of the unity of human
nature. He distinguished types of humanity which differ not only in physical
but also in mental characteristics. In fact, he thought that the individual types
were constant, namely, fixed by nature; they are products of nature. From
this it follows that human history must be understood as natural history.25

The notion of polygenism, once stated, was not scientifically confounded
until the 1980s with the discoveries made about the human genome and its rich
historical value by human population genetics.26 While the question of humans
as a unified single race has been answered affirmatively by science, evolutionary
studies have reshaped the definition of polygenesis from the perspective of the
question of dual origins of material and immaterial elements of the universe.
Polygenesism As It Relates to the Origin of the Soul
Within Roman Catholicism, the question of polygenism arises in regard to the
impartation of the immortal soul into the material creation for the purpose
Hair black; eyes dark; fevere haughty, covetous. Covered with loose garments. Governed
by opinions.
5. Black, phlegmatic, relaxed (i.e., Afer).
Hair black, frizzled; skin silky; nose flat; lips tumid; craft [sic] indolent, negligent.
Anoints himself with grease. Governed by caprice.”
6. Fabled people (Monstrosus).
(Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Race and the Enlightenment, 13; cited in James Samuel
Logan, Good Punishment? Christian Moral Practice and U.S. Imprisonment [Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2008], 123).
24
See, e.g., Johann Gottfried Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of
Mankind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). Here Herder attempts to
demonstrate that the nation of Germany had been set apart by Providence in terms
of language, inclinations, character, and heredity.
25
Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology, Gifford Lecture Series, 1954-1955,
Lecture 1: “The Problem of History and Historicity” (http://www.giffordlectures.
org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPESCH&Volume=0&Issue=0&ArticleID=3); in the
German, see idem, Geschichte und Eschatologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1979), 11. The
German states: “Herder zerbrach die Vorstellung von der Einheit der menschlichen
Natur. Er unterschied menschliche Typen, die sich nicht nur durch physische,
sondern auch durch psychische Besonderheiten voneinander unterscheiden. Er hat
freilich diese individuellen Typen als constant angesehen, nämlich als durch die Natur
festgelegt. Sie sind Naturprodukte. Daraus folgt, dass die menschliche Geschichte als
Naturgeschichte verstanden werden muss.”
26
Spencer Wells, Deep Ancestry: Inside the Genographic Project (Washington, DC:
National Geographic, 2006), 25.
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of specially creating human beings. Jesuit scholar Teilhard de Chardin once
commented that “in the eyes of science, which at long range can only see
things in bulk, the ‘first man’ is and can only be a crowd, and his infancy is
made up of thousands and thousands of years.”27 What de Chardin means
here is that Adam is a universal concept, the symbol of all fallen humanity
who are marked by original sin in the moment that they become human
beings. There was, contra Roman Catholic theology, no first Adam who
committed original sin. Rather humanity is subject to original sin because this
is the condition imposed upon humanity due to the evolutionary nature of
the world—original sin is the law of the universe.28 De Chardin’s justification
for such a proposal is that even though the problem of monogenism versus
polygenism is ultimately a theological problem, the fact that science studies
populations rather than individuals (and Roman Catholicism, on this point,
deals with the individual impartation of the immortal soul), means that there
should not be a contradiction between theological explanations and scientific
findings.29
Karl Rahner, S. J., who similarly accepted polygenesis as a reasonable
answer to the question of dual origins, stated, in contradiction to Popes
Pius XII30 and Paul VI,31 that “In the present state of theology and science
it cannot be proved that polygenism conflicts with orthodox teaching on
original sin. It would be better therefore if the magisterium refrained from
censuring polygenism.”32 He continues:
It is doubtful, to say the least, whether a bodily, historical unity of the first
human beings can be understood in terms of monogenism. It is a general
principle of biology that true, concrete genetic unity is not found in the
individual but in the population . . . and in the same biotype (organisms of
the same genetic constitution). Only within such a situation can evolution

27
Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper and Row,
1959), 185.
28
Robert Faricy, Teilhard de Chardin’s Theology of the Christian in the World (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1967), 158-159, n. 46.
29
Teilhard de Chardin, Monogenisme et monophyletisme, 1950: 1-2 (Woodstock
Theological Center Library, Special Collections Division, Washington, DC, Box 7,
Folder 38).
30
Pope Pius XII, Humani Generis (Weston, MA: Weston College Press, 1951).
31
Pope Paul VI, L’Osservatore Romano, 15 July 1966; cited in Original Sin in the
Light of Modern Science, Patrick O’Connell (Houston: Lumen Christi Press, 1973), 9091.
32
Karl Rahner, “Evolution and Original Sin,” in The Evolving World and Theology,
Concilium, 26 (GlenRock: Paulist Press, 1967), 64; see also idem, “Theologisches zum
Monogenismus,” Schriften zur Theologie 1 (1954): 262 (271-275).
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come about since selection can exercise its pressure only within such a
population and not in isolated individuals.33

Thus the question of dual origins of the body and immortal soul, as
well as the possibility of the dual origins of human beings as a result of
evolutionary development, have become increasingly important to Roman
Catholics, especially those promoting a so-called “healthy” relationship
between evolutionary theory and the church’s teaching on the nature and
ontology of human beings. Such a view, its proponents believe, is not
in conflict with a long evolutionary process and can, according to some,
allow for the accommodation of Roman Catholic theology to evolutionary
perspectives. However, as we will observe later, Roman Catholicism has not
pronounced any authoritative word on either the question of evolution or
the issue of polygenesis, although several popes have commented, from
a slightly less-than dogmatic position, in favor of monogenism and the
“appropriate” use of evolutionary theory.34
Monogenism As It Relates to Human Ancestry
Monogenism is the notion that humans are descended from a single pair of
ancestors.35 It has not only a biblical-theological, but also a scientific definition.
The scientific understanding of monogenism is described by scientist Spencer
Wells, who points out that “Any piece of DNA that is not shuffled through the
action of recombination can be traced back in time to an earlier ancestor.”36
Of the nearly seven billion pieces of mtDNA, or in other words, the world’s
current human population, and about half that number of Y-chromosomes,
all can be traced back to a sole root.37 “This entity, known as the coalescence
Ranher, “Evolution and Original Sin,” 64. Two more recent articles accepting
de Chardin’s and Rahner’s position on polygenism are Joan Acker, “Creation and
Catholicism,” America, 16 December 2000, 6-8; and Daryl P. Domning, “Evolution,
Evil and Original Sin,” America, 12 November 2001, 17-20.
34
E.g., Pius XII, Humani Generis, and Paul VI in L’Osservatore Romano. See
also P. Schoonenberg, Het Geloof van ons Doopsel (Hertogenbosch, NL: 1955), 1:143144. Berkouwer, 280, n. 3, states: “The canon [Humani Generis] affirmed belief in the
common origin of the human race in Adam, and condemned those who denied it,
holding that such denial would involve the dogma of original sin and the salvation
of all men in Christ. It was prepared because of the denial of monogenism by some
‘geologists and ethnographers.’”
33

Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “monogenesis” (http://oxforddictionaries.com/
?attempted=true).
36
Wells, Deep Ancestry, 155.
37
Mitochondrial DNA, or mtDNA, is that which can traced solely in the maternal
line of inheritance. Y-chromosomes are one of two sex chromosomes, the other being
an X-chromosome. Females have two X-chromosomes, while males have an X- and
35
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point, is the single mtDNA or Y-chromosome type from which they all trace
their descent. In any given sample of nonrecombining DNA sequences there
must be a single ancestor at some point in the past.”38 This ancient pair have,
evocatively, been named Adam and Eve.39
Wells is only too happy to promote his concept of monogenism because
as recently as the 1960s little was known about how the vast diversity observed
in humans came about. He points to the anthropological work of Carleton
Coon, The Origin of Races,40 which became a standard text for students of
anthropology beginning in the late 1960s, as an example of how the racial
profiling of earlier generations continued to the present. Coon recognized
essentially the same classification of human beings as Linneaus had, excluding
only Linneaus’s fictitious Monstrosus category. Like others before him, Coon
used Darwinian evolution to explain how the races had once been united, but
separated over time to create such a wide diversity as seen today.41
Wells comments on the basis of Coon’s proposal that Coon’s conclusions
were based on
Very little, it turned out. Anthropologists of his era were largely limited to
a method used since the time of the Greeks—morphology, or appearance.
Although morphologists measured the physical traits they studied very
carefully, derived complex formulae to describe their measurements, and
inferred processes from the data, they were working at a disadvantage.
This is because morphological variation is ultimately produced by genetic
variation, and the under-lying [sic] genetic changes required to produce a
change in morphology were (for the most part) still unknown.42

Thus it turns out that Coon, on the basis of morphology alone, was
saying that “it would have taken a million years of evolution to create the
Y-chromosome. DNA in the Y-chromosome passes from father to son, while mtDNA
passes from the mother to both daughters and sons.
38
Ibid., 156.
39
Ibid. See also an interview with Rebecca Cann, lead researcher at Berkeley on
the discovery of mtDNA (Nova, “Children of Eve” (Boston: WGBH Educational
Foundation, 1986), transcript, 1.
40
Carleton Coon, The Origin of Races (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
41
Wells, 17. For two other sources of the effects of British and American racial
profiling, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasre of Man (New York: W. W. Norton,
1981); and Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin’s Sacred Cause: How a Hatred of
Slavery Shaped Darwin’s Views of Human Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2009). While Desmond and Moore may overstate their case as to Darwin’s personal
sentiments and its relationship to his theory on the descent of humanity, both they
and Gould provide a sobering historical look at the extent of racial profiling and its
encouragement by Christians, including politicians and men of the cloth.
42
Ibid., 18.
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differences we see in different races.”43 Wells’s and others’ research into the
mysteries of the human genome have revealed uncontrovertibly that “Only
the tiniest sliver of [genetic] variation . . . served to distinguish among the
different races.”44 Further,
As Lewontin explained it, if someone were to drop an atomic bomb
tomorrow, and the only group of people left alive were the English—or
the Australian Aborigines, or the Pygmies of the Ituri Forest—that single
population would still retain 85 percent of the level of genetic variation
found in our species as a whole. This incredible result provided clear
evidence that Linneaus and Coon were wrong. Rather than belonging to
discrete subspecies, humans are part of one big extended family. 45

Wells’s proposals are a reaffirmation of the long-held belief in
monogenesis as it pertains to human ancestry. According to biblical theology,
the human pair from which humanity sprang was Adam and Eve (Gen 4:1:
“Adam lay with his wife Eve, and she became pregnant and gave birth to
Cain. She said, ‘With the help of the Lord I have brought forth a man.’”).46
However, the question of monogenesis as it pertains to the origin of the
immortal soul is still debated, as we have seen, by Roman Catholic scholars
and others who posit a form of polygenesis in order to accommodate the role
of evolutionary science in the origins of the material body and yet allow for
the divine role in the originating of the immortal soul.
Monogenism As It Relates to the Origin of the Soul
Due to its obvious sense of dualism in regard to the impartation of the
immortal soul in human beings, Roman Catholicism’s orthodox views,
especially since the appearance of Darwinian evolution, have called for
clarification. The first serious papal pronouncement on the topic of
monogenesis took place with the publication of Humani Generis in 1950. Pius
XII seems to have made this statement in response to the growing encounter
between theology and science.47 However, as P. Schoonenberg notes, the
discussion had come up in the 1870 Vatican Council, which prepared a canon
positing monogenism in response to the direction that biological science was

Ibid.
Ibid., 21.
45
Ibid., 21-22.
46
It must be clarified that Wells and Cann, among others, do not support the
notion that the biblical Adam and Eve were historical entities who brought forth
humanity. Rather this couple are merely symbols, as noted above, of a universalized
history of human origins.
47
Berkouwer, 280.
43
44

78

Seminary Studies 49 (Spring 2011)

then tending toward. However, because the issue was not brought up during
the council, monogenism never became dogma.48
Darwin had published his Origin of the Species in 1859, and would, just
months after the 1870 Vatican Council, publish his long-awaited treatise, The
Descent of Man (1871), in which he proposed that no specialness separated
human beings from any other living organism. “Man’s intelligence, use of
language, altruism, and so on, all could be derived from rudimentary traits
discernible in lower animals.”49 Darwin thus noted in the conclusion of his
first chapter in The Descent of Man that “the time will before long come, when
it will be thought wonderful [i.e., incredulous] that naturalists, who were well
acquainted with the comparative structure and development of man, and
other mammals, should have believed that each was the work of a separate act
of creation.”50 However, in The Descent of Man, Darwin does not stop with the
question of human ancestry, but pushes on to declare that “We have seen that
the study of the theory of expression confirms to a certain limited extent the
conclusion that man is derived from some lower animal form, and supports
the belief of the specific or subspecific unity of the several races; . . . We
have also seen that expression in itself, or the language of the emotions, as
it has sometimes been called, is certainly of importance for the welfare of
mankind.”51
The response of the Roman Catholic Church to such types of proposals,
while not officially dogmatized, is one of concern for maintaining a clear
proposal of monogensis in regard to the unity of humanity. Claudio Basevi
states:
From the perspective of the biblical doctrine of creation, the results are
clearly sterile and exegetically incorrect when one focuses the discussion
about Scripture and scientific thought on the fallacious dialectic between
“creationism” and “evolutionism,” the first understood as the affirmation
of the “immediate” appearance of all the species of living beings and the
denial of any biological or even geological transformations, the second
understood as a philosophical paradigm that interprets the morphogenesis
of all reality in terms of a necessary and immanent development, or as the
outcome of blind chance. Biblical exegesis can confront and dialogue with
the facts, and therefore with evolution, physical or biological, explained
in a scientific way and freed from presuppositions of an aprioristic
philosophical character. The presence of analogous presuppositions
Schoonenberg, 143-144; see Berkouwer, 280, n. 3.
James D. Watson, “Commentary: The Descent of Man,” in Darwin: The Indelible
Stamp: The Evolution of an Idea, ed. and commentary James D. Watson (Philadelphia:
Running Press, 2005), 604.
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an Idea, ed. and commentary James D. Watson (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2005), 629.
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also cannot be excluded in what concerns the theme of “monogenism,”
i.e., the origin of the whole human race from one sole couple of protoparents. Supported by various biblical passages and by the teaching of
the Catholic Magisterium, this belief is presented at times as something
certainly denied by scientific results, without reflecting on the fact that,
for obvious reasons, the scientific reconstruction, however accurate it may
be, could never attain irrefutable proofs for or against it. To this must be
added the consideration that scientific analysis can only deduce a posteriori
if and when it finds itself in front of remains that are certainly human,
but it cannot conclude anything about the appearance of a first couple of
proto-parents in as much as the “final cause” of such an appearance —the
spiritual animation of a body, a new creative intervention of God, etc.—
does not belong to the empirical order, whereas only the consequences
traceable back to it are.52

Thus from the perspective of Roman Catholic orthodoxy, while there
is room for scientific, even evolutionary scientific, discussion about the
physical origins of humans, there remains a domain upon which science
has little or nothing to add. This domain includes within it the origin of the
immortal soul.53 Basevi notes that the issue of monogenism is so important
to orthodoxy because it is connected with the “‘normative’ consequences
of the proto-parents for all of humanity, particularly to the doctrine of
original sin, but also to the recapitulation in Christianity of all that was
signified in Adam, to the point that the abandonment of monogenism would
require a serious re-interpretation by theology of much of the content of
Revelation.”54
Summary
Roman Catholic theologians are thus divided on the issue of monogenesis,
with those desiring a “healthy” relationship between the church’s theology
concerning the origin of the immortal soul and the evolutionary pronouncement
concerning the origin of the material universe calling for polygenesis, while
those claiming theological orthodoxy proposing the separate creations of soul
and body, and yet unified co-existence of these two elements as the foundation
of human ontology. Both allow for the introduction of evolutionary science
because in both the immortal soul, long considered to be the true essence of
humanity, remains distinct from its material counterpart.
Claudio Basevi, “Sacred Scripture,” Inters (Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion
and Science), ed. Giuseppe Tanze-Nitti, Philip Larrey, and Alberto Strumìa (http://
www.disf.org/en/Voci/12.asp).
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The question remains, however, as to the importance of these issues to
the dialogue between science and theology. As we shall discover below, not
only were Darwin and his contemporaries concerned with the question of the
immortal soul, but the Intelligent Design movement, as expressed through
Dembski et al., also retains its alliance with the notion of an immortal soul.
However, as we shall see, Dembski et al. carefully nuance their understanding
of the origin of the soul behind their claim to intelligent design as a scientific
concept.
Early Scientific Discussion Concerning the Immortality of the Soul
Darwin’s Thoughts on the Question of the Immortal Soul
The debate between theology and science on the topic of origins, whether
material or immaterial, was thus interactive and two-way. Darwin himself,
as we have already seen, was concerned with immaterial issues, such as the
emotions and the mind, which had generally fallen beyond the purview of
science up to that point. Significantly, behind the scenes his researches were
not simply dedicated to physical and psychological phenomena, but he also
regularly included books on the topic of the immortal soul to his reading list;
for instance, he included in his “Books to be Read” and “Books Read” Notebook
Francis William Newman’s The Soul, Her Sorrows and Her Aspirations: An Essay
Towards the Natural History of the Soul as the True Basis of Theology (London,
1849); Alexander Copland’s Mortal Life: and the State of the Soul After Death:
Conformable to Divine Revelation; Oersted’s Soul of Nature (which he describes
as “dreadful”); and he notes Toland’s 1704 “account of immortality of Soul,
amongst Ancients.”55
Darwin experienced considerable turmoil about the immortal soul. His
turmoil lay in part with his reluctance to hurt his closely knit family, especially
his betrothed, Emma Wedgwood, who was also his cousin. In a revealing
paragraph, Adrian Desmond and James Moore, recount Darwin’s struggle,
noting that just prior to his engagement his father advised him
to conceal his doubts about religion lest Emma fret for his ‘salvation’.
(The Doctor understood devout Wedgwood women, having married one
himself.) But sharing so much of an outlook, Darwin thought candour the
better policy, and a week after the engagement he went ahead and told her
of his notebook heresies. Such shocking beliefs were a negation of her
deeply intuitive faith. He was erasing the line between body and soul. To
him, morality and religious feelings were inherited from beasts rather than
Breathed into the body. What need, then, for revelation of religious truth in
the Bible? If Jesus’s resurrection did not reveal the promise of immortality,
how could she and Charles belong to each other for ever? Traditional
Charles Darwin, “Books to be Read” and “Books Read” Notebook (Darwin
Online, http://darwin-online.org,uk/).
55
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Unitarianism, as espoused by Martineau, saw no necessary conflict here,
and Darwin’s views might have been squared with it. Not so Emma’s
Anglicanized Unitarianism, with its belief in an immortal soul. She sought
reassurance and ‘every word’ he sent by return was a comfort. He said that
he did not consider his ‘opinion as formed’ (too late was he heeding the
Doctor’s advice), which gave her hope.56

Darwin works out his convictions on the immotal soul in his personal
notebooks. For instance, in Notebook B: [Transmutation of species (18371838)], he notes:
The soul by consent of all is superadded, animals not got, not look forward.
If we choose to let conjecture run wild then our animals our fellow brethren
in pain, disease, death & suffering, & famine, our slave in the most laborious
works, our companions in our amusements, they may partake from our
origin in these one common ancestor; we may be all netted together.57

Thus Darwin questioned whether the addition of an immortal soul
into humans was in fact a reality. If all organisms were descended from one
stock, then humans must have received the same orientation toward pain and
suffering, among other conditions generally regarded as especially human, as
did these lesser organisms.
In Notebook E [Transmutation of species (1838-1839)], Darwin finds
a discontinuity between the pronouncements of Plato and Socrates on the
immorality of the soul and his own conception of the “linear descendant” of
“mammiferous animal.”58 He also struggles with the Platonic notion that “our
‘necessary ideas’ arise from the preexistence of the soul, are not derivable
from experience.”59
In his “Old & Useless Notes about the Moral Sense & Some Metaphysical
Points,” Darwin plays with the idea of instinct versus soul in his musings
on William Kirby’s Bridgewater Treatise, On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of
God.60 He notes: “As in animal no prejudices about souls, we have particular
trains of thoughts as far as man; crows fear of gun.—pointers method of
standing.—method of attacking peccary—retriever—produced as soon as
Desmon and Moore, 136.
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brain developed, and as I have said, no soul superadded.”61 A footnote on
this point states:
“[Lamarck] admits [man] to be the most perfect of animals, but instead
of a son of God, the root of his genealogical tree, according to him, is an
animalcule, a creature without sense or voluntary motion, or internal or
external organs . . . no wonder therefore that he considers his intellectual
powers, not as indicating a spiritual substance derived from heaven though
resident in his body, but merely as the result of his organization (N. Dict.
Nat. xvi. Artic. Intelligence, 344, comp. Ibid. Artic. Idéa, 78, 80.), and
ascribes to him in the place of a soul a certain interior sentiment . . .”
See also B 232, “The soul by consent of all is superadded . . .”62

Thus Darwin does not take lightly the question of the immortal soul.
His behind-the-scene thinking on the subject eventually resulted in the denial
of humans as special creations endowed by God with immortal souls, leading
him to conclude:
We must acknowledge, as it seems to me, that man with all his noble
qualities, with sympathy which feels for the most debased, with benevolence
which extends not only to other men but to the humblest living creature,
with his god-like intellect which had penetrated into the movements and
constitution of the solar system—with all these exalted powers, man still
bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin.63

Darwin’s Contemporaries’ Thoughts Regarding the
Immortal Soul and Its Relation to
Evolutionary Theory
A brief sampling64 of Darwin’s contemporaries demonstrates that they
also deeply contemplated the issue of the immortal soul and its relation to
their contemporary scientific theory. For instance, John Frederick William
Herschel, F.R.S., an English mathematician, astronomer, chemist, experimental
photographer/inventor and botanist, whose work in scientific methodology
(1840)65 greatly influenced Darwin, scoffed at those who believed that science
Charles Darwin, “Old & Useless Notes about the Moral Sense & Some
Metaphysical Points” (1838-1839) (Darwin Online, http://darwin-online.org.uk/], 36,
elipses original.
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“fosters in its cultivators an undue and overweening self-conceit, [that] leads
them to doubt the immortality of the soul and to scoff at revealed religion.”66
Rather, science, Herschel proposed,
by cherishing as a vital principle an unbounded spirit of enquiry, and
ardency of expectation, . . . unfetters the mind from prejudices of every
kind, and leaves it open and free to every impression of a higher nature
which it is susceptible of receiving, guarding only against enthusiasm and
self-deception by a habit of strict investigation, but encouraging, rather
than suppressing, every thing that can offer a prospect or a hope beyond
the present obscure and unsatisfactory state.67

In 1844, Robert Chambers, F.R.S.E., who moved in highly influential
scientific and political circles, anonymously published his Vestiges of the Natural
History of Creation,68 which claimed in the concluding chapter to be “the first
attempt to connect the natural sciences in a history of creation.”69 The book
was highly criticized due to Chambers’s stance that God might not be actively
involved in the sustenance of the natural and social hierarchies. In regard to
the immortal soul, he contended that
A distinction is therefore [often] drawn between our mental manifestations
and those of the lower animals, the latter being comprehended under the
term instinct, while ours are collectively described as mind, mind being again
a received synonyme with soul, the immortal part of man. There is here a
strange system of confusion and error, which it is most imprudent to regard
as essential to religion, since candid investigations of nature tend to shew its
untenableness. There is, in reality, nothing to prevent our regarding man as
specially endowed with an immortal spirit, at the same time that his ordinary
mental manifestations are looked upon as simple phenomena resulting from
organization [i.e., purely physical processes], those of lower animals being
phenomena absolutely the same in character, though developed with much
narrower limits.70

Significant for our concern in this paper, Chambers’s remarks about the
immortal soul indicate his concern regarding the possibility of dual origins
of immaterial soul and material body. His footnote connected to this passage
further strengthens this point, arguing that God, as first cause, was the creator
of not only immaterial soul and mind, but also matter itself, through which
these immaterial properties flow.71 However, he asks,
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 7-8.
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Can we say that God has not in matter itself laid the seeds of every faculty of
mind, rather than that he has made the first principle of mind entirely distinct
from that of matter? Cannot the first cause of all we see and know have
fraught matter itself, from its very beginning, with all the attributes necessary
to develop into mind, as well as he have from the first made the attributes of
mind wholly different from those of matter, only in order afterwards, by an
imperceptible and incomprehensible link, to join the two together?72

This “imperceptible and incomprehensible link” between mind (i.e.,
immortal soul) and matter seemed to Chambers to be unnecessary. Rather
a scientific perspective appeared, to him, to demonstrate the plausibility of
an organic unity between the two elements, a unity given by God himself.
Pointing to the New Testament, Chambers then concludes that the Scriptures
do not present a soul, after death, having no connection with space and time,
having no connection with matter. Citing Thomas Hope, On the Origins and
Prospects of Man (1831), Chambers notes that the New Testament “‘promises
a mind situated in portions of time and space different from the present; a
mind composed of elements of matter more extended, more perfect, and
more glorious,”73 thereby demonstrating his remaining reliance upon older
concepts of the immortal soul.
George Combe, a Scottish phrenologist, who, among other things,
studied and sought how to reform and punish the criminal classes,
distinguished between his understanding of the immortal soul and his view
of death, which was similar to that proposed by Darwin. Combe, in 1847,
notes that “The true view of death, therefore, as a natural institution is, that
it is an essential part of the system of organisation. . . . Besides, organized
beings are constituted by the Creator to be the food of other organized
beings, so that some must die that others may live.”74 To clarify whence his
argument regarding death leads, he proposed that “To prevent, however,
all chance of being misapprehended, I repeat, that I do not at all allude to
the state of the soul or mind after death, but merely to the dissolution of
organized bodies; that, according to the soundest view which I am able to
obtain of the natural law, pain and death during youth and middle age, in the
human species, are consequences of departure from the Creator’s law, while
death in old age, by insensible decay, is an essential part of the system of
organic existence as now constituted.”75
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Also in 1847, Richard Owen, English botanist, creator of the term
“Dinosauria,” and a fierce opponent of Darwin’s concept of evolution (he was
himself an evolutionist, but felt that Darwin’s proposal was too simplified),
proposed that “This [bodily] frame is a temporary trust, for the uses of which
we are responsible to the Maker.”76 A monogenist, Owen proposed that “The
supreme work of Creation has been accomplished that you might possess a
body—the sole erect—of all animal bodies the most free—and for what? for
the service of the soul.”77
Reactions to Darwin’s The Descent of Man
When Darwin’s The Descent of Man was published in 1871, the response was
immediate and varied.78 A review in The Athenaeum, no. 2262, 4 March 1871,
opined that “An evolutionist of the Darwinian order is bound to be further
than the moral sense and the intellectual faculties if he believes in the existence
of the human soul. . . . As certainly as we evolve sex, so certainly must we
evolve soul. If the former be due purely to natural selection, so is the latter.”
A review in The Saturday Analyst and Leader, dated 10 November 1860,
proposed that there was no “contradiction in the endowment of man with an
immaterial soul, supposing him to have originated according to the Darwinian
theory, than if he had originated in any other way. Put it broadly: was it more
easy for Omnipotence, to which all possible things are equally easy, to give
man an immaterial soul, if made out of clay; than if he spring from the next
resembling animal type?” Further, the Mosaic account “does not conflict with
the indefinite modifiability of man, but on the contrary agrees with it.” The
reviewer affirms this point by noting the great diversity of humanity that has
proceeded from Adam and Eve, “in a word, all the different species of men
on the face of the earth, must have developed and differentiated out of one
primitive type.”
The New York Daily Tribune of 1 June 1871 noted that “Darwin himself
admits that somewhere in the vast line of human development, the soul, by
Divine power, was made immortal,” while The Saturday Review, 24 December
1859, postulated that “No conceivable amount of evidence derived from the
growth and structure of animals and plants would have the slightest bearing
upon our convictions in regard to the origin of conscience, or man’s belief
76
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in a Supreme Being and the immortality of his own soul. . . . We know that
there are limits which human reason is unable to overpass, but we believe
that those limits will be more surely ascertained and fixed by the right use of
reason itself than by the edict of an external authority.”
Continuing in the vein of denigrating the “external authority” of
Scripture, a review from The Literary World, 17 March 1871, remarked
condescendingly: “He who believes in the advancement of man from some
lowly organised form, will naturally ask how does this bear on the belief in
the immortality of the soul. The barbarous races of man, as Sir J. Lubbock
has shown, possess no clear belief of this kind; but arguments derived from
the primeval beliefs of savages are, as we have just seen, of little or no
avail.”
The Liverpool Leader, 18 March 1871, assured its readers that no danger
was to come to natural theology as proposed by Paley by Darwin’s concepts
of humanity. The author notes that no matter how one might conceive of the
origin of things,
Our minds are so constituted that they cannot rest content with a mere
sequence of lifeless and mechanical causes; they must work back until they
reach, as the ground and cause of all these secondary causes, an intelligent
volitional Being, in some way resembling that which is highest in the soul of
man. At this point our curiosity can and does pause, not as comprehending,
but as conscious that it has reached the end of its tether. The mind, knowing
that it cannot in the least comprehend, or get behind, one of its own acts
of free volition—every one of which is, on a smaller scale, a veritable
creation—is for that very reason prepared to acknowledge that, when it has
reached such a mystery as the will of an intelligent Creator, it has reached a
limit which it cannot pass. Till it has reached this point, however, the search
for causes cannot stop.

This idea of the restless soul that must search to find its meaning is also
reflected in a review from The Nonconformist, 4 May 1871, which provides a
fitting summation of the deeply ingrained notions regarding the immortal
soul and its place within scientific discussion, especially in regard to the
question of the essence of humanity. In a direct echo of William Perry’s
earlier pronouncements of polygenism, the review proposes that Darwin’s
theory of evolution must necessarily stop at the level of savage life because
there Darwin
leaves humanity fixed, rigid, immoveable. In order to go beyond this,
man must rise ‘above himself ’ . . . . From this point the life of man is
not simply human; it is Divine, and cannot be completed without Divine
intervention, which infantile science ignores, and calls ‘a break,’ and leaves
to be discussed in ‘another place.’ Yet here, if anywhere, the noblest
Biology commences, and science must yet find some way of bringing its
theories of evolution up to this better elevation. We do not ask this of
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Mr. Darwin, and if the sense of deficiency has been forced upon us, he
himself and his Psychology must bear the blame.

To be finally and completely human, one must possess that final element of
humanness, the immortal soul.
Summary
Thus it is that Darwin and his colleagues struggled with the question of the
immortal soul and its relation to Darwin’s evolutionary theory. However, these
are not merely the ramblings of an older, less-informed age. The debate over
the immortal soul continues in contemporary discussions among theologians
and scientists. It is to this hidden dimension in the writings of William A.
Dembski and his colleagues that we now turn.
William A. Dembski et al. and the Immorality of the Soul
One particularly evocative hint that the newly emerging Intelligent Design
movement of the late twentieth century was something more than a new,
alternative approach to Darwinian evolution in terms of material origins was
presented in Signs of Intelligence: Understanding Intelligent Design, edited by William
A. Dembski and James M. Kushiner. For the remainder of this discussion on
the continuing importance of the immortality of the soul and its relation
to science, we will look at the claims about the need for the reintroduction
of the immaterial immortal soul into modern science made by the various
proponents of the Intelligent Design movement.
John G. West Jr.
Some fifty pages after Dembski’s pronouncement that “Proponents of
intelligent design regard it as a scientific research program that investigates
the effects of intelligent causes,” and his assertion that the Intelligent Design
movement is “not religiously motivated,”79 John G. West Jr. boldly proposes
that Intelligent Design
suggests that mind precedes matter and that intelligence is an irreducible
property just like matter. This opens the door to an effective alternative to
materialistic reductionism. If intelligence itself is an irreducible property,
then it is improper to try to reduce mind to matter. Mind can only be
explained in terms of itself—like matter is explained in terms of itself.
In short, intelligent design opens the door to a theory of a nonmaterial soul that can be
defended within the bounds of science.80
Dembski, 17, 12.
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Kushiner, 66, emphasis supplied.
79
80

88

Seminary Studies 49 (Spring 2011)

West then proposes five effects of an established belief in the
immortality of the soul for public policy in the United States: within a
legally recognized system of science based upon intelligent design that
incorporates within it a belief in the immorality of the soul, (1) welfare
policies would stop focusing narrowly on “changing material inputs” and
would look at “issues of character and accountability”; (2) traditional
morality would be reinstated and “would promote honest questioning of
whether certain behaviors—such as adultery—really do serve a biological
function” and “may provide a powerful way to check the moral relativism
spawned by scientific materialism, especially in the areas of family life and
sexual behavior”; (3) in regard to the sanctity of life, “Once the idea of a
nonmaterial soul gains new currency, the ethical context in which issues
such as abortion and euthanasia are debated will considerably expand”; (4)
in defense of science itself, intelligent design would supply “a framework
for science that can account for the full richness of what human beings
really are” and “help restore the integrity of science”; and (5) intelligent
design helps to support free inquiry because “it admits a far wider range
of possible explanations in scientific discussions” and is not, like modern
science, “monocausal.”81
Not only is West’s proposal for the reintroduction of the immortal
soul seemingly inappropriate from the perspective of the Intelligent Design
movement’s stated claims of “scientific theory alone,” but it also invites a
sobering reflection on the meaning of a political system that is based entirely
upon the views of one religiously oriented segment of the population.
John Mark Reynolds
In his essay, “Getting God a Pass,” John Mark Reynolds laments the lapse of
psychology into materialistically oriented veins. He notes that “Traditional
Christians have almost universally proclaimed their belief in an immortal
soul, distinct from the brain. People have souls. If people have souls not
made of matter and energy, an important limitation is placed on a naturalistic
science.”82 The problem with “theistic naturalists,” Reynolds proposes, is that
they have discarded the notion of the immortal soul, which they find to be
“theologically controversial.” Such a move leaves people without souls and
provides them with brains. “Mind, for these thinkers, can be explained as the
product of matter and energy. There is no ‘ghost’ in the machine. . . . The
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theistic naturalist then argues that this is how biblical revelation and Christian
theology should have been understood all along.”83
Reynolds finds a corrective for this problem not in the realm of science,
but in the act of worshiping, which joins together body and soul, noting: “From
the first to the last “in the historic liturgy of the church the mystery of the
Passion is connected to the mystery of the Word that became flesh. Christians
have never hated matter and energy, for our God took on human form.”84
Once again the question is begged as to how this reintroduction of the
immortal soul fits within the realm of scientific discipline.
William A. Dembski
Dembski addresses the question of the soul in his book, The End of Christianity:
Finding a Good God in an Evil World. In it, he challenges the notion that the
earth is a place for “soul-making.”85 He proposes that because “sin propagates
through nature and brings about natural evil,” the “disordered state of nature
mirrors the disordered state of our souls.”86 The process of redemption, for
Dembski, is based upon the notion of the free will of the soul. The turning
back to God cannot be “coerced.”87 But the role of redemption is broader
in scope. For Dembski, it is about the “reordering” of everything, including
the soul. “Thus nature, which now reflects humanity’s fallen state, needs to
be restored,” an event which takes place in the redemptive processes of “the
Cross and Resurrection of Jesus Christ.”88
Dembski also expresses his concern that mainstream contemporary
Christianity has lost its traditional understanding of the fall. His following
statement is telling about his views regarding the immortal soul:
Referring natural evil to the freedom of creation rather than to the Fall
has become a consistent pattern in contemporary theology, which seeks to
redress the Fall by rationalizing why the Fall isn’t, as it seemed to previous
generations of theologians, a horrible tragedy. Such rationalizations are
absent from the O felix culpa (O fortunate fault) tradition of classical
Christian theology. This tradition redresses the Fall by pointing to the great
redemption in Christ that the Fall elicits. In that tradition, just because a good
outweighs an evil does nothing to make the evil less evil. Yes, in the end we
will be better off because Jesus saved us from evil rather than because we
happened to be descendants of an Adam and an Eve who escaped evil by
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never sinning. But their sin and its consequences must, even in the O felix
culpa tradition, be viewed as tragedy.89

Dembski argues “that cosmic and transhistorical consequences to
human sin remain eminently reasonable. . . . In fact, . . . viewing natural
evil as a consequence of the Fall is entirely compatible with mainstream
understandings of cosmic and natural history.”90 Further, he proposes,
“Redemption is a painful business. . . . Redemption is God having the final
word.”91 Dembski has arrived at his concept of the soul and its relation
to natural phenomena and science. In the interactive relationship between
God and human beings, God seeks to restore the fallen soul and bring it
and the creation into relationship with himself. Berkouwer is correct when
he proposes that “Protestant discussion [of original sin] did not center on
the dilemma of monogenism or polygenism, which played no role in the
controversy between creationism and traducianism, but rather on the other
question of the ‘inheritance’ of sin.”92 Thus for Dembski this inherited
original sin is of a destructive nature not only to humans but to the whole
creation. The process of redemption is one in which not only humans will
share, but also the whole of creation.
In summary, it would seem then that Dembski proposes a type
of traducianism—once the original purity of the soul is lost in the fall,
the immortal soul becomes transmitted through parentage, as with the
animals.93
Summary
While it is quite true that Dembski et al. speak very little about the relation
of the immortal soul in their concept of Intelligent Design, what they do say
is significant and seems to reflect that their position in general is religiously
motivated. First and foremost is the fact that the intelligent designer they
invoke is not simply concerned with human ancestry, but, importantly, with
the origin of the immortal soul. This is reflected in Dembski et al.’s application
of the soul to the question of morality and the problem of evil. Further, all of
the individuals examined here but Dembski seem to apply a Roman Catholic/
Reformed paradigm of dual creationism to their understanding of the body
and the immoral soul, while Dembski himself seems to lean toward a traducian
perspective. Therefore, the Intelligent Design movement seems to fall within
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the older tradition of the theology-and-science dialogues of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, making it an effictively religious position.94
Conclusion
As we have observed, the question of the immortal soul remains an important
element within the theology-and-science dialogue. Further, the meaning of
the term “creationism” must be carefully understood, as it may be applied
independently or simultaneously to both the origin of human ancestry and the
origin of the immortal soul. As Neal C. Gillespie notes, “The core of special
creation, then, was . . . the direct, volitional, and purposeful intervention of
God in the course of nature, by whatever means, to create something new.”95
However, as we have seen, even within this definition there is great room for
differing perspectives. As Gillespie further notes: “The use of the word creation
in itself means nothing. Its meaning can be determined only by the context in
which it appears and by what is known independently about the beliefs of the
author in question. Interpretation is further complicated by the fact that the
same author may use the term in different ways during his career.”96
It is important, then, for scholars in the theology-and-science dialogue
to understand the terminology of creationism. Creationism, as applied to the
origin of the soul, transcends the question of human ancestry by allowing the
discussion of issues of God and morality, but it also allows human ancestry
to be discussed exclusively within the purview of natural science. The
Intelligent Design movement brings the question of God’s relationship to
and activity in the world to the forefront. While this is helpful, it does not go
far enough in defining the foundations of intelligent design, and it ultimately
accepts the Creationist/Traducianist perspectives of traditional, mainstream
evangelicalism of the twentieth century. For those who do not ascribe to the
concept of the immortal soul, there remains a discontinuity between science
and theology that begs a theological response. Creationists who espouse a
biblically based understanding of creation, which is not evolutionary, and
who do not believe in a doctrine of the immortal soul need to dig deeper for
a responsible discussion on the creation.97
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